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COMMENTS

What Is "False or Misleading" Off-Label
Promotion?
Kathryn Bit
INTRODUCTION

In the late 1990s, the drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline obtained
some exciting research results about the antidepressant Wellbutrin. 1 Rather than interfering with sex drive and sleep cycle
like many competing products, Wellbutrin appeared to have positive side effects, like suppressing appetite and reducing cigarette cravings.2 GlaxoSmithKline could have sought formal endorsement of these findings from the FDA. Instead, the
drugmaker embarked on a marketing campaign that would lead
3
to one of the largest health care settlements in history.
A federal complaint describes how GlaxoSmithKline executives designed and systematically executed "Operation Hustle"
to perform follow-up studies and generate buzz about the use of
Wellbutrin for conditions that frequently accompany depression,
including weight gain, sexual dysfunction, and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder. 4 The firm sponsored group seminars to
t BA, BE 2009, Dartmouth College; JD Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 See United States' Complaint, United States v GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civil Action No 11-10398-RWZ, *21, 37-38 (D Mass filed Oct 26, 2011) ("GSK Complaint"), archived at http://perma.cc/QD57-J849 (describing various findings that GlaxoSmithKline
compiled regarding Welbutrin's effectiveness for off-label uses and its mechanism of
action).
2
See id at *35-38.
3 See Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve FraudAllegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (US Department of Justice,
July 2, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/A6HM-K5RF ("GSK Press Release"); Settlement Agreement, United States v GlaxoSmithKline PLC *7 (July 2, 2012) ("GSK Settlement"), archived at http://perma.cc/6PKM-EGGZ.
4
GSK Complaint at *25 (cited in note 1). Though specific details of the data are
unavailable, GlaxoSmithKline's studies were likely narrower in scope than standard
clinical trials, targeting particular patient populations. For example, one study is described as testing twenty-five patients for eight weeks. See id at *21. This design is
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provide physicians with details about the scientific support for
its claims and dispatched sales representatives to doctors' offices
to tout Wellbutrin as a "happy, horny, skinny pill."5 Though
GlaxoSmithKline's tests lacked FDA endorsement, the firm's
marketing strategies worked. 6 Sales increased by a third in less
7
than a year.
GlaxoSmithKline's successful campaign led to a slew of lawsuits accusing the company of promoting drugs for unapproved
("off-label") uses. 8 None of the complaints, however, actually
claimed that GlaxoSmithKline had made false or misleading
statements about Wellbutrin. The complaints acknowledged
that physicians who prescribed Wellbutrin understood the promotional nature of GlaxoSmithKline's messaging. One complaint even recounted how a physician described the company's
seminar speaker as a "drug whore." 9 In fact, despite all the negative publicity, Wellbutrin remains a hugely popular drug, with
some prominent physicians endorsing the scientific support for
its beneficial side effects.10
The Wellbutrin story raises difficult questions about how to
distinguish harmful off-label marketing from information that
physicians find useful when making prescribing decisions. In
particular, how should courts determine whether a physician's
reliance on off-label claims is the result of useful education as
opposed to successful duping? Since the Wellbutrin case settled,
developments in the federal courts have brought this question to
prominence. This Comment provides an answer. Part I describes
the current legal framework for regulating drug advertising and
explains the emerging importance of developing a test for identifying "false or misleading" off-label promotion. Part II explains
the framework for identifying false or misleading advertisements

typical for a merely exploratory study-while large enough to provide statistically significant results about weight loss over the first few weeks of Wellbutrin use, this study's
design does not meet the expansive FDA requirements of double blinding, placebo control, and randomization. See 32 CFR § 314.126(b)(2)(i).
5 GSK Complaint at *19, 34-39 (cited in note 1).
6 Seeid at*21-23.
7 See id at *25.
8 See id at *2-3 (listing various civil actions that had been separately filed against
GlaxoSmithKline and that were later consolidated into a single action upon government
intervention).
9 GSK Complaint at *32 (cited in note 1).
10 See Sari Botton, The Happy, Sexy, Skinny, Pill? (Harper's Bazaar, Feb 19, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/J8QS-RULX.
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under the Lanham Act"1 and the Federal Trade Commission
Act12 ("FTC Act") and demonstrates that this framework is appropriate for the off-label-promotion context. Part III explores
how the false advertising approach can be adapted to the offlabel context.
I. THE LAW OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
Though off-label promotion is at the center of numerous active lawsuits and a national policy debate, courts have not yet
addressed what constitutes "false or misleading" off-label
speech. This Part provides the legal background pertinent to defining the term. Section A describes how the government ensures the safety and effectiveness of new drugs. Section B addresses the legal status of off-label promotion. Section C
explains why that legal status has, until recently, obviated the
need to devise a framework for identifying false or misleading
off-label speech, and why recent cases will require courts to do
so now.

A.

The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's Drug Safety and
Effectiveness Requirements

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act13 (FDCA) requires drugmakers to obtain FDA approval before marketing a
new drug. 14 The approval process begins when a drug company
identifies a promising product. 15 The drug company files a New
Drug Application (NDA) to alert the FDA of the company's intention to seek approval for the drug and request that the FDA
begin the new-drug evaluation process. 16 The FDA estimates
that this evaluation typically takes more than eight years to
17
complete.
The FDA can approve a new drug only if extensive scientific
studies demonstrate that the drug is safe and effective.18 These

11

15 USC § 1051 et seq.
12 15 USC § 41 et seq.
13 21 USC § 301 et seq.
14 See 21 USC § 355(a).
15 See Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill, and Lewis A. Grossman, Food and
Drug Law 669-70 (Foundation 4th ed 2014).

16

See 21 USC § 355(a)-(b).

17 See Drug Development and Review Definitions (US Food and Drug Administration, Mar 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L57E-SBH2.
18 See 21 USC § 355(d):
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studies, known as clinical trials, consist of highly structured experiments jointly designed by the FDA and the drugmaker. 19
The data obtained from these trials must affirmatively demonstrate that the drug is safe and must yield "substantial evidence" that the drug will be effective for the use for which it is to
be marketed.20 If the drug meets these threshold requirements,
the FDA uses the clinical trial data to determine whether the
balance of the drug's risks and benefits supports approval for
21
the specified use.
The FDA grants approval on a use-by-use basis. Since the
FDCA defines a "new drug" as one that is "not generally recognized, among experts ... as safe and effective" for a particular
use, a "new drug" can be either an entirely new substance or a
preexisting drug that the drugmaker seeks to have prescribed
for a different illness or condition.22 In either case, the drugmaker must conduct clinical trials if it wishes to obtain FDA approval for the use. 23 Once the FDA grants approval for a use, the
drugmaker may list the use on the drug's label and market the
drug for that use. 24
B. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Policing OffLabel Promotion
There is considerable debate about whether pharmaceutical
companies should be allowed to promote drugs for off-label uses.
When litigating cases under the FDCA, the FDA has taken the
position that off-label promotion is harmful because it undermines drugmakers' incentives to seek approval for new uses of
their products. 25 The FDA's view reflects the concern that drug

If the Secretary finds ... [that the application does not] include adequate tests
by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe
for use under the conditions prescribed . . . [or] the results of such tests show
that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions or do not show that such
drug is safe for use under such conditions ... [the Secretary] shall issue an order refusing to approve the application.
19

See 21 USC § 355(b)(5)(B), (d).
21 USC § 355(d).
21 See Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman, Food and Drug Law at 729 (cited in note 15).
22 21 USC § 321(p)(1).
23 See 21 USC § 355(b)(5)(B).
24 See 21 CFR § 201.100(c)(2).
25 See, for example, Thompson v Western States Medical Center, 535 US 357, 36869 (2002) (describing the FDA's argument that "individual doctors ... cannot be relied upon" to make "scientifically valid" judgments about safety and effectiveness); Washington
Legal Foundation v Friedman, 13 F Supp 2d 51, 56-57 (DDC 1998); Coleen Klasmeier and
20
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manufacturers engaging in off-label promotion are seeking to
evade the regulatory process, either because they wish to avoid
the costs of conducting clinical trials, or because their data
would not pass muster with the FDA.26 If that were so, the argument goes, doctors who received information about off-label
uses might be encouraged to prescribe treatments that would
27
not meet the FDA's high approval standards.
No federal statute or regulation prohibits off-label promotion, however. Because of this, the government can prosecute
drug companies for off-label promotion only indirectly, under the
FDCA's prohibition of misbranding.28 The term "misbranding"
refers to a variety of behaviors,29 and companies that engage in
30
misbranding may be subject to civil and criminal penalties.
Two forms of misbranding under the FDCA are relevant to
off-label promotion: misbranding based on false or misleading
advertising3l and misbranding based on drug-labeling requirements. 32 Statutory provisions prohibiting each of these types of

Martin H. Redish, Off-Label PrescriptionAdvertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection,37 Am J L & Med 315, 335
n 98 (2011) (noting that the FDA has asserted "in the off-label promotion context that
adequate protection of the public health requires unwavering enforcement of the high
standards for efficacy data"). Importantly, the FDA's position is not entitled to deference.
The Supreme Court does not defer to agency positions advanced in litigation that are
"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice." Bowen v
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204, 212 (1988). The FDA has not promulgated
regulations that specifically ban off-label promotion, and any such regulations would
likely violate the First Amendment. See Part I.C. 1.
26 See Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman, Food and Drug Law at 925 (cited in note 15).
This concern is particularly acute in light of the FDA's lengthy premarket-approval process. See Drug Development and Review Definitions (cited in note 17).
27
See Kate Greenwood, The Ban on "Off-Label" PharmaceuticalPromotion: Constitutionally Permissible Prophylaxis against False or Misleading Commercial Speech?, 37
Am J L & Med 278, 294 (2011) ("Busy, boundedly rational physicians are an inadequate
check on companies' tendencies to overstate the scientific support for off-label uses.");
Klasmeier and Redish, 37 Am J L & Med at 335 n 98 (cited in note 25).
28 See 21 USC § 331(a)-(c) (prohibiting the misbranding of drugs, as well as the
transportation and receipt of misbranded drugs in interstate commerce). See also Marc
J. Scheineson and Guillermo Cuevas, United States v. Caronia: The Increasing Strength
of Commercial Free Speech and PotentialNew Emphasis on Classifying Off-Label Promotion as "Falseand Misleading",68 Food & Drug L J 201, 204-07 (2013) (describing the
statutory framework under which the FDA regulates off-label promotion).
29 For a complete list of such behaviors, see 21 USC § 352 (defining a drug as "misbranded" if, for example, the drug's packaging fails to prominently display certain statutorily specified information, the drug's label recommends a health-endangering dosage,
or the drug is offered for sale under another drug's name).
30 See 21 USC § 333.
31 See 21 USC § 352(bb).
32 See 21 USC § 352(f).
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misbranding allow the FDA to penalize companies for certain
communications to physicians and consumers. The advertising
33
provision prohibits false or misleading promotional statements,
while the labeling provision prohibits marketing drugs without
providing sufficient guidance for their use. 34 This Section first
describes both forms of misbranding. It then turns to the effect
of the government's decision to focus on prosecuting off-label
promotion through the labeling provision rather than the advertising provision.
1. Misbranding based on false or misleading advertising.
The form of misbranding most clearly pertinent to off-label
promotion relates to drug advertising. Under the FDCA, a drug
company may be liable for misbranding if the drug's "advertising
or promotion ... is false or misleading."35 According to the regulations that interpret this provision, an advertisement is false or
misleading if it is not an accurate representation of the drug's
safety and effectiveness.36
The regulations associated with the advertising-related
misbranding provision provide appropriate guidelines for sorting
useful off-label promotion from that which might lead doctors to
prescribe unsafe or ineffective drugs. Rather than outlining
broadly applicable benchmarks for determining whether a promotional statement meets a satisfactory standard of scientific
certainty, the regulations urge a fact-specific analysis. Specifically, an advertising claim is false or misleading if it does not reflect the weight of "substantial evidence or substantial clinical
experience" with the drug. 37 The regulations provide an extensive list of behaviors that might constitute misrepresentation,
ranging from improper data analysis 38 to the overstatement of
research results. 39 Notably, the regulations are agnostic about
FDA approval status and theoretically apply to both on- and offlabel marketing claims.

33
34
35
36

37
38
39

21
21
21
21
21
21
21

USC
USC
USC
CFR
CFR
CFR
CFR

§ 352(bb).
§ 352(f).
§ 352(bb).
§ 202.1(e)(6).
§ 202.1(e)(6)(i).
§ 202.1(e)(7)(ii)-(v).
§ 202.1(e)(7)(i).
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2. Misbranding based on drug-labeling requirements.
Though the advertising provision is a precise and apposite
tool for deterring harmful off-label promotion, the government
has generally taken the more circuitous approach of demonstrating misbranding through a failure to meet the FDCA's labeling
requirements. These labeling requirements provide that a drug
is misbranded if its label does not contain "adequate directions
for us[ing]" the drug.40 The instructions on the label must be sufficient to allow practitioners to "use the drug safely and for the
purposes for which it is intended."41 To prove misbranding, the
government must show both that the drugmaker intended for
doctors to prescribe the drug for a particular use, and that the
label does not provide adequate directions for that use.
This interpretation of the labeling provision requires a perfect correspondence between the drugmaker's intended uses and
the uses listed on the label. Since a drug's label may include instructions only for FDA-approved uses, 42 it is impossible for the
label to provide "adequate" directions for engaging in off-label
use. Thus, under the FDA's interpretation of the labeling provision, a drug is misbranded whenever a drug company intends
that a drug be prescribed for an off-label use. 43
This interpretation is damning for off-label promotion because, according to FDA regulations, a drugmaker's promotional
statements are evidence of its intended use for the drug.44 A
drugmaker's "advertising matter, or oral or written statements"
may be evidence of objective intent.45 FDA regulations go so far
as to conclude that a drugmaker's knowledge "that [its drug] is
...offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled
nor advertised" may demonstrate that the drugmaker intended

40 21 USC § 352(f). For a concise explanation of labeling requirements, see Luke
Dawson, Note, A Spoonful of Free Speech Helps the Medicine Go Down: Off-Label Speech
& the First Amendment, 99 Iowa L Rev 803, 810-11 (2014).
41
21 CFR § 201.100(c)(1).
42
See 21 USC § 355(d) (stating that NDAs must be rejected if there is insufficient
evidence to support the drug's proposed labeling).
43 See, for example, United States v Caronia, 703 F3d 149, 154-55 (2d Cir 2012)
(explaining that "[the FDA] has construed the FDCA to prohibit promotional speech as
misbranding itself' by treating off-label promotional speech as dispositive evidence that
the drugmaker intends the drug to be used for an unapproved purpose).
44 See 21 CFR § 201.128 (providing that such intent may be "determined by [a
drugmaker's] expressions or may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the [drug]").
45 21 CFR § 201.128.
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for the drug to be prescribed for that use-even if a third party
46
made the statements.
Since virtually any discussion of off-label use can be evidence that a drug does not contain "adequate directions for"
each intended use of that drug, the FDA's construction of the
FDCA's labeling requirements effectively makes off-label promotion per se unlawful. 47 Under this interpretation, the government can prove misbranding simply by demonstrating that the
company engaged in off-label promotion. Because proving that a
promotional statement is directed toward an off-label use is
more straightforward than proving that an off-label statement is
false or misleading, the government's interpretation of the labeling provision has obviated the need to pursue claims under the
advertising provision.
The government's chosen theory of liability is unsurprising.
In the FDA's view, off-label promotion not only poses a potential
threat to patient safety but also undermines the substantial
government interest in ensuring that patients benefit from the
effectiveness evaluation included in the NDA process. 48 Though
courts sometimes acknowledge the curious "asymmetry" inherent in a legal regime that allows off-label prescriptions but not
off-label promotion, 49 many have accepted the FDA's construction of the statute.5 0 The government has prosecuted numerous

21 CFR § 201.128.
John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 Yale J Health Pol, L & Ethics
299, 309 (2010), quoting 21 USC § 352(f)(1). See also Osborn, 10 Yale J Health Pol, L &
Ethics at 308-09 (citations omitted) ("[T]he Act's prohibition of false or misleading labeling is transformed by the agency into an effective prohibition on any advertisement,
promotional message, or discussion that is not 'consistent with' the approved product
labeling, or otherwise concerns any use that has not been approved expressly by
the FDA.").
48 See Western States Medical Center, 535 US at 369:
46

47

[T]he safety and effectiveness of a new drug needs to be established by rigorous, scientifically valid clinical studies because impressions of individual doctors, who cannot themselves compile sufficient safety data, cannot be relied
upon .... [T]he Government has every reason to want as many drugs as possible to be subject to [the] approval process.
But see Caronia,703 F3d at 153 ("Indeed, courts and the FDA have recognized the propriety and potential public value of unapproved or off-label drug use.").
49 See, for example, In re Schering Plough Corp Intron/Temodar Consumer Class
Action, 678 F3d 235, 240 (3d Cir 2012).
50 See, for example, United States v Caputo, 288 F Supp 2d 912, 920 (ND Ill 2003)
("[P]romoting off-label uses makes [a product] misbranded.").
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pharmaceutical companies for off-label promotion through its
construction of the FDCA's labeling provision.51
3. The FDA's de facto authority to control off-label speech.
With off-label speech effectively banned, the FDA ultimately
has the power to delineate the boundaries of acceptable off-label
promotion. Historically, the agency has set these boundaries
through the use of both its rulemaking authority and its prosecutorial discretion. The agency has recognized that, in some cases, off-label promotion can further medical science. 52 To capture
these benefits, the FDA formally condones off-label communication in two limited situations: when the communication meets
the requirements of the scientific-exchange exception to the general bar on off-label speech, and when the communication is
transmitted in conjunction with a drug company's participation
in the Investigational New Drug (IND) application program.
First, the FDA's scientific-exchange exception consists of
regulations that permit drugmakers and physicians to communicate the underlying science about off-label uses.5 3
Knowledge about new uses for a drug might emerge after the
drug's initial approval-particularly in heavily researched fields
of medicine that are constantly evolving.54 Since doctors are free
to prescribe drugs for both FDA-approved and unapproved
uses,5 5 communication with drugmakers can allow doctors to obtain and use new research findings without waiting for the FDA
to complete its lengthy approval process. 56 Such off-label prescriptions can have tangible public health benefits-the medical
community considers some off-label uses to be "state of the art"
procedures for treating certain conditions. 57
To facilitate such developments, the scientific-exchange exception allows drug companies to publish information about

51 See, for example, Caronia,703 F3d at 154.
52 See, for example, Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F Supp 2d at 56 ("Even the
FDA acknowledges that in some specific and narrow areas of medical practice, practitioners consider off-label use to constitute the standard of good medical care.").
53 See Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman, Food and Drug Law at 925-26 (cited in
note 15).
54 See J. Howard Beales III, Economic Analysis and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 1370, 1386 (1994).
55 See Buckman Co v Plaintiffs'Legal Committee, 531 US 341, 351 n 5 (2001).
56 See Beales, 24 Seton Hall L Rev at 1387 (cited in note 54).
57 James M. Beck and Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 Food & Drug L J 71, 85 (1998).
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off-label uses in medical journals and then distribute unabridged, unaltered copies of those published articles to physicians.5 8 At a minimum, the articles must be subjected to peer re-

view by independent experts who disclose any conflicts of
interest, and each article must be published in a journal that is
not funded by the drugmaker. 59
Alternatively, a drug company that wishes to communicate
information more informally may do so by first submitting an
IND application to officially begin the exploration of a new use
for a previously approved drug.60 Then, throughout the investigation, the drug company may share "information concerning
the drug, including dissemination of scientific findings in scientific or lay media." 61 Though the drug company cannot represent

that the drug is "safe or effective" for the use under investigation,62 the ability to disseminate scientific information without
meeting the strict standards of the scientific-exchange exception
allows drug companies to convey preliminary research results in
more informal ways.
Even with regard to communications disseminated under
these authorized exceptions to the off-label-promotion ban, the
FDA reserves the right to independently determine whether offlabel speech is false or misleading.63 FDA guidance provides several examples of what constitutes false or misleading communication.64 Based on these examples, it is clear that the FDA holds

drugmakers to a higher standard than mere truthfulness. For
instance, a claim in a scientific or medical journal is misleading
if it is based on a clinical study that would not meet the specific
requirements of the FDA clinical trial process-even if the

58 See Guidance for Industry: Good Reprint Practicesfor the Distributionof Medical
Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publicationson Unapproved New
Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices (US Food and Drug
Administration, Jan 2009) ("FDA Guidance on Scientific Exchange"), archived at
http://perma.cc/2X97-KEBJ.
59 See id.
60 See 21 CFR § 312.20(a).
61 21 CFR § 312.7(a).
62 21 CFR § 312.7(a).
63 See FDA Guidance on Scientific Exchange (cited in note 58).
64 See id (deeming information in a scientific or medical journal to be "false or misleading" if, for example, it discusses a clinical investigation that the FDA has previously

deemed inadequate or if it mischaracterizes the extent to which its claims conflict with
"well-controlled clinical investigations").
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research results were overwhelmingly persuasive or accompanied by a disclaimer.65
However, since the FDA does not regularly approve or disapprove scientific information before a drug company communicates it,66 the exact standard for what constitutes acceptable offlabel communication is unclear.67 Drug companies that wish to
minimize their chance of facing an FDA enforcement action thus
have an incentive to withhold information about uses that are
not yet supported by studies conducted in accordance with FDA
best practices.
This uncertainty is problematic because it impedes the very
off-label communications that are most valuable to the development of medical science.68 Off-label research is particularly useful when it pertains to uses for which a drugmaker is unlikely to
seek FDA approval. For example, off-label promotion may be the
best means of disseminating information about a new use that is
discovered late in the life of a product's patent, when a drugmaker can no longer justify the cost of seeking approval for new
uses.

69

Most commonly, off-label information pertains to discoveries
about which it is too risky or expensive to seek FDA approval,
such as weak health effects or effects that occur in a small subset of the potential patient population.70 Though the exact benefits of such information may be speculative, patients stand to
gain in the long run from information dissemination, particularly when the alternative treatment options are fungible. For example, data suggesting that Wellbutrin improves impulse control might help to inform a physician's marginal decision about

65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Reference to prior FDA warning letters would likely provide insufficient guidance for drug companies, because most warning letters are fairly vague and the details of
a drug company's resolution of the warning letter are not published. Moreover, it is not
clear that one drug company could glean much regarding how to communicate about its
own experiment from analyzing communications about other companies' studies, because
experimental designs and approaches vary widely. See Scheineson and Cuevas, 68 Food
& Drug L J at 214 (cited in note 28) (noting the breadth of the FDA's various interpretations of "misleading speech" in the context of off-label promotion).
68 See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of
the FDA, 358 New Eng J Med 1427, 1427 (2008).
69 See Beales, 24 Seton Hall L Rev at 1387 (cited in note 54).
70 See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion:Balancing Public
Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 Am J L & Med 225, 253-54 (2011) (explaining
how off-label information might uniquely benefit small subsets of patients).
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which antidepressant to prescribe for a gambling addict.71 In
such cases, the off-label use of a drug may be a patient's best
treatment option.72 Because the scientific-exchange and IND exceptions do not provide for such communication, neither approach precisely distinguishes between helpful and harmful offlabel speech.
C.

Emerging Questions about the Definition of False or
Misleading Off-Label Speech

As a result of the government's effective ban on off-label
promotion and the high standard for the scientific-exchange exception, 73 courts have rarely had to grapple with the complex issue of distinguishing between misleading and nonmisleading
speech about off-label uses.7 4 This is likely to change for two reasons. First, federal courts are increasingly recognizing corporate
free speech rights, which may render the FDA's construction of
the FDCA unconstitutional. Second, recent cases have created
incentives for private parties to pursue legal action for false or
misleading speech under other statutes.
1. Off-label promotion and the First Amendment.
Drugmakers have argued that an outright ban on off-label
speech-including speech that is neither false nor misleadingviolates the First Amendment7 5 Because off-label prescriptions
are "lawful, the argument goes, it must also be lawful to tell
[doctors] about them."76 Though the Supreme Court has recognized that maintaining the integrity of the NDA process is a
substantial government interest that might support speech regulation, 77 such regulation must not be "more extensive than []
necessary" to achieve that objective7 s When determining whether the regulation of commercial speech is more extensive than
71 See generally Choosing Antidepressantsfor Adults: Clinician'sGuide (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Aug 2007), archived at http://perma.ccWLA4-48VZ.
72
See Kesselheim, 37 Am J L & Med at 238 (cited in note 70).
73 See Part I.B.3.
74 See Scheineson and Cuevas, 68 Food & Drug L J at 212 (cited in note 28) (noting
the lack of precedent addressing the question of how "misleading" should be defined in
the context of off-label speech).
75 See, for example, Caronia,703 F3d at 152.
76 United States v Caputo, 517 F3d 935, 938 (7th Cir 2008).
77 See Western States Medical Center, 535 US at 369.
78 Id at 371, quoting Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York, 447 US 557, 566 (1980).
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necessary, courts consider factors such as whether the commercial speaker has alternative channels for communicating truthful, nonmisleading information, and whether the government
79
could adopt a less-speech-restrictive regulatory approach.
The drugmakers' free speech argument has recently gained
traction. In Thompson v Western States Medical Center,80 for example, the Supreme Court held that FDA restrictions on advertising for compounded drugs were unconstitutional81 Compounded drugs-which are medications that combine two or
more FDA-approved drugs to form a single medication-are not
subject to FDA regulation.82 The Court determined that it would
be nonsensical to allow drug companies to make, and doctors to
prescribe, compounded drugs but not allow drug companies to
promote them.83 The Court determined that the government can
have no interest in "preventing the dissemination of truthful
commercial information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the information."84
In the same vein, the Court specifically held in Sorrell v
IMS Health 1nc85 that "[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing [] is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment."6 The Court noted that the
"fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information" cannot, alone, justify content-based regulations of
pharmaceutical marketing,7 particularly when the audience
consists of "sophisticated and experienced" consumers such as
prescribing physicians.88 Thus, the Court ruled that restrictions
on pharmaceutical-marketing speech are subject to heightened

79 See 44 Liquormart, Inc v Rhode Island, 517 US 484, 529-30 (1996) (O'Connor
concurring). See also Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 131 S Ct 2653, 2667-68 (2011) (placing
the burden on the government to demonstrate that a statute restricting commercial
speech "directly advances a substantial governmental interest and ... is drawn to
achieve that interest").
80 535 US 357 (2002).
81 Id at 373-77.
82 See id at 361, 364.
s3 See id at 372-77.
84 Western States Medical Center, 535 US at 374. See also id at 375, citing Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc, 425 US 748, 769-70
(1976).
85 131 S Ct 2653 (2011).
86 Id at 2659.
87 Id at 2670-71, quoting Western States Medical Center, 535 US at 374.
88 Sorrell, 131 S Ct at 2671, quoting Edenfield v Fane, 507 US 761, 775 (1993).
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scrutiny,89 so long as the speech in question is not false or
misleading. 90
Though Western States Medical Center and Sorrell addressed pharmaceutical-marketing issues other than off-label
marketing, both opinions are written in broad language that
implies that all restrictions on drug-marketing speechincluding those meant to ensure patient safety-are now subject
to strict scrutiny. Applying this Supreme Court precedent to offlabel marketing, the Second Circuit concluded in United States v
Caronia91 that off-label marketing cannot be per se unlawful.92
Because independent researchers can speak freely about offlabel uses, an outright ban on off-label speech by pharmaceutical companies would constitute an impermissible, speaker-based
restriction under Sorrell.93 Noting that there are numerous less
restrictive alternatives available to ensure that drug companies
communicate responsibly,94 the court held that "the government
cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful,
off-label use of an FDA-approved drug."95 In other words, in the
Second Circuit, off-label promotion that is not false or misleading is not per se unlawful.96
The Caronia decision has brought into focus the question of
what constitutes false or misleading promotional speech. Many
commentators have argued that Caroniawill be the first in a series of decisions leading to a safe harbor for truthful off-label
promotional speech.97 Indeed, several district courts have already cited Caroniafor the proposition that the FDCA does not
prohibit truthful, nonmisleading off-label promotion.98

Sorrell, 131 S Ct at 2663-67.
90 Id at 2672, citing Western States Medical Center, 535 US at 373.
91 703 F3d 149 (2d Cir 2012).
92 Id at 164 (holding that FDA prohibitions on off-label speech are subject to
heightened scrutiny).
93 Id at 165, 168.
94 See id at 167.
95 Caronia,703 F3d at 169.
96 Id at 164, 165 n 10.
97 See, for example, John C. Richter and Daniel C. Sale, The Future of Off-Label
Promotion Enforcement in the Wake of Caronia-Toward a FirstAmendment Safe Harbor, 14 Sedona ConfJ 19, 34 (2013).
98 See, for example, Schouest v Medtronic, Inc, 13 F Supp 3d 692, 702-03 (SD Tex
2014); Schuler v Medtronic, Inc, 2014 WL 988516, *1 (CD Cal); In re Celexa and Lexapro
Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 2014 WL 3908126, *7 (D Mass); Dawson v
Medtronic, Inc, 2013 WL 4048850, *5 (D SC).
89
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Whether the circuits agree that off-label marketing is not
per se unlawful, the government will likely respond to the possibility of First Amendment protection by more consistently alleging that off-label promotions are false or misleading (under the
FDCA's advertising-based misbranding provision) when prosecuting drug companies and their representatives.99 Indeed, the
government has brought charges of false or misleading off-label
oo The government's
promotion in several cases since Caronia.1
decision to consistently allege that drug companies have engaged in false or misleading off-label promotion is a departure
from the FDA's past failure to distinguish its claims of misbranding due to false or misleading advertising from its claims
of misbranding due to a failure to meet the FDA's labeling
requirements. 101
2. Incentives for private-party claims.
The definition of false or misleading off-label promotion is
also of great interest to nongovernmental plaintiffs. For example, health insurers pay much higher reimbursement costs when
an off-label promotion leads physicians to prescribe new and expensive on-patent drugs rather than existing, cheaper treatments. 02 Several recent rulings increase private parties' incentives to take legal action to rectify such damages.
Most significant among these cases is the Supreme Court's decision in POM Wonderful LLC v Coca-Cola Co.103 There, the Court
held that the government's exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute
claims of misleading advertising under the FDCA does not
99 See Scheineson and Cuevas, 68 Food & Drug L J at 211 (cited in note 28); Marcia
M. Boumil and Kaitlyn L. Dunn, Off-Label Marketing of PharmaceuticalProducts in the
Wake of United States v. Caronia and United States v. Harkonen, 9 J Health & Biomedical L 385, 430-31 (2014) (noting some of the ways in which the government's approach to
arguing off-label claims might change in the wake of Caronia).
100 See, for example, Complaint, United States v Shire Specialty Pharmaceuticals,
Civil Action No 08-4795, *8 (ED Pa filed Oct 7, 2008) ("Shire Specialty Complaint"). See
also Third Amended Complaint, United States v Bayer Corp, Civil Action No 05-3895,
*22-23 (D NJ filed Mar 1, 2010); Complaint, United States v Janssen Pharmaceutical
Products LP, Civil Action No 04-cv-1529, *11, 18-21 (ED Pa filed Nov 4, 2013). For industry commentary about the relationship between Caronia and false or misleading accusations, see Michael Rogoff, Manvin Mayell, and Paula Ramer, The Aftermath of
Caronia in Pursuing Off-Label Cases (InsideCounsel, Mar 10, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/92QE-AHPR.
101 See Scheineson and Cuevas, 68 Food & Drug L J at 205-06, 211 (cited in note 28).
102 See In re Neurontin Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation, 712 F3d 21, 27-28
(1st Cir 2013).
103 134 S Ct 2228 (2014).
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preclude suits for false or misleading advertising under other
statutes.1 0 4 This decision eliminated a substantial source of legal
uncertainty for prospective plaintiffs and is likely to encourage
private-party suits in the future.
A number of statutes provide for such causes of action.
Notably, the recent First Circuit decision in In re Neurontin
Marketing and Sales Practice Litigationlo5 demonstrated that
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act06
(RICO) can be a vehicle to seek damages for fraudulent off-label
marketing.107 The decision is an important precedent on how to
apply RICO to off-label marketing, an issue that had been a
source of considerable uncertainty.108 Competitors of companies
that engage in false or misleading off-label marketing can also
seek damages for lost sales under the Lanham Act.109 Finally,
private parties with information about false or misleading offlabel marketing-including drug-company employees-may assist the government in pursuing claims through the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act.110 In light of the increased incentives for private parties to bring claims since POM Wonderful, developing a clear test for whether off-label promotion is
false or misleading is more important than ever.

104

Id at 2233.

105 712 F3d 21 (1st Cir 2013).

18 USC § 1961 et seq.
In re Neurontin, 712 F3d at 25-27.
108 See J. Gordon Cooney Jr, John P. Lavelle Jr, and Bahar Shariati, Back to the Future: Civil RICO in Off-Label Promotion Litigation, 77 Defense Counsel J 168, 169-70
(2010) (discussing the wide variety of ways in which courts previously resisted the application of RICO to off-label marketing).
109 See 15 USC § 1051 et seq. See also generally, for example, Zeneca Inc v Eli Lilly
and Co, 1999 WL 509471 (SDNY). Examples of such cases are rare, because it was unclear whether such suits were precluded prior to POM Wonderful.
110 31 USC § 3729 et seq. For an example of such a suit, see Shire Specialty Complaint at *14-15 (cited in note 100). The case settled in September 2014. See Press Release, Shire PharmaceuticalsLLC to Pay $56.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Relating to Drug Marketingand Promotion Practices(US Department of Justice,
Sept 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3UYX-4TFU. See also Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert, and Troyen A. Brennan, Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label
Promotion of Pharmaceuticals,360 New Eng J Med 1557, 1561 (2009) (describing the use
of the False Claims Act to seek damages for economic harm caused by off-label promotion).
106
107

2015]

What Is "Falseor Misleading"Off-Label Promotion?

991

II. DEFINING "FALSE OR MISLEADING"
Though claims of false or misleading off-label marketing are
likely to increase, there is no single, working definition of the
term. In the FDCA context, courts have rarely addressed the issue because the dominant assumption of per se unlawfulness
had rendered such a definition unimportant."' Extrajudicial
sources of information do not provide useful guidance either.112
The FDA has not advanced a definition of "false or misleading"
for the off-label context. Though the FDA has promulgated regulations describing the characteristics of false or misleading onlabel marketing, 113 these regulations are not, on their own, sufficient to address off-label marketing. In one sense, their guidance
is too general for the off-label context: the regulations for onlabel marketing involve advertising to the lay audience, whereas
14
physicians are the relevant audience for off-label marketing."
In another sense, the guidance is too specific: it relates only to
claims about studies and uses that have received FDA approval,
as opposed to those that have not. Moreover, these regulations
seem to conflict somewhat with the few examples of false or misleading off-label claims that are described in the FDA's guidance
on proper scientific exchange.115 Thus, the agency's position is
far from certain.
Nor have litigants (including the government) agreed on a
precise definition of "false or misleading" under other statutes.
111 When courts have addressed off-label marketing in the non-FDCA context, the
typical fact pattern has involved such blatant data falsification or premeditated fraud
that little in-depth analysis has been required. See, for example, In re Neurontin, 712
F3d at 28 (finding that Pfizer sponsored "misleading informational supplement and continuing medical education" courses and suppressed "negative information about Neurontin while publishing articles in medical journals that reported positive information");
United States v Harkonen, 510 Fed Appx 633, 636 (9th Cir 2013) (noting that the defendant stated that he would "cut that data and slice it until [he] got the kind of results
[he was] looking for").
112 Even the academic literature has not reached a consensus. Some commentators
have recognized that establishing a standard of truthfulness is likely to be an important
issue in the future but have generally focused on developing arguments for upholding an
off-label ban. See, for example, Greenwood, 37 Am J L & Med at 280, 291 (cited in note
27); Elissa Phillip, United States v. Caronia: How True Does "Truthful"Have to Be?, 67
Vand L Rev En Banc 157, 166-69 (2014).
113 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(6)-(7) (listing behaviors that constitute "false or misleading"
advertising, such as mischaracterizing the results of drug studies or overstating the
safety of a given drug).
114 See Parts II.B, III.C.
115 While the advertising regulations simply require that advertising speech be
truthful and nonmisleading, the standard for scientific exchange seems to be higher. See
text accompanying notes 53-65.
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Briefs and settlement agreements typically state that the relevant drug marketing was false or misleading without specifically describing what aspect of the claims establishes that fact. 116
Because most cases have proceeded under the qui tam provision
of the False Claims Act and have ended in settlement,17 there
are few detailed evaluations of whether off-label speech is false
or misleading. Further, complainants' briefs are the only detailed exposition of the law and facts in such cases, and they
provide only a partial and biased representation of how the law
might be interpreted.118
However, the courts have developed a definition of the term
"false or misleading" for the commercial-advertising context under two federal false advertising statutes: the Lanham Act and
the FTC Act (the "false advertising statutes"). This Part argues
that the definition of "false or misleading" developed in the case
law associated with the false advertising statutes should be applied to the definition of "false or misleading" in the off-labelpromotion context. Section A provides a brief overview of the
false advertising framework. Section B demonstrates that this
existing "false or misleading" definition is also appropriate for
the FDCA context.
A. "False or Misleading" under the False Advertising Statutes
Two federal statutes prohibit false or misleading advertising
and promotion: the Lanham Act and the FTC Act. The Lanham
Act gives competitors standing to sue for false advertising,119
while the FTC Act establishes the FTC and gives the Commission the authority to prosecute false advertising claims.120
Though the statutes differ in terms of legal purpose-the Lanham Act protects competitors against unfair competition, while
the FTC Act prevents consumer deception-the definition of
"false or misleading" consists of essentially the same elements
under both statutes. Specifically, a court must find that the

116 See, for example, GSK Complaint at *7, 41 (cited in note 1); GSK Settlement at
*3-5 (cited in note 3).
117 See 31 USC § 3730(b).
118 Because the government does not accord Chevron deference to agency positions
advanced in litigation, the government's briefs do not necessarily reflect how courts
would likely resolve these cases. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev
187, 214-15 (2006).
119 See 15 USC § 1125(a).
120 See 15 USC § 41; 15 USC § 53(a).
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advertisement is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a
121
material way.
To determine whether an advertisement is deceptive under
the false advertising statutes, courts first consider the advertisement from the perspective of a reasonable member of the
audience for a drug advertisement.122 If the reasonable audience
member would take material action based on the advertisement,
courts compare this material action to what is justified based on
an objective analysis of all the facts known to the producer of the
product.123 An advertisement is an actionable misrepresentation
if a reasonable audience member's reaction differs from what
would otherwise be justified by the complete information.124
B.

"False or Misleading" under the FDCA

Policing off-label speech presents analogous challenges to
those presented in false advertising cases. Off-label speech, like
advertising, is commercial and self-interested in nature. And offlabel speech, like advertising, can generate enormous value for
consumers. In both contexts, an appropriate definition of false or
misleading speech must balance the public's competing interests
in consumer and competitor protection on the one hand and the
dissemination of useful information on the other.
Given these parallels, it seems natural that courts considering off-label marketing cases in the Lanham Act context would

121 The FTC clarified this definition in a 1983 Policy Statement. See FTC Policy
Statement on Deception (Federal Trade Commission, Oct 14, 1983), archived at
http://perma.cc/6WW2-TY3H. Courts apply a similar formulation under the Lanham Act.
See, for example, Sandoz PharmaceuticalsCorp v Richardson-Vicks, Inc, 902 F2d 222,
231 (3d Cir 1990) ("A Lanham Act plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the defendant's promotions contained a material representation or description, and (2) that this material representation or description was false or verifiably
misleading.").
122 See In the Matter of Thompson Medical Co, 104 FTC 648, 688 (1984). Courts applying the Lanham Act generally require extrinsic evidence of consumer decisions. See,
for example, American Council of Certified PodiatricPhysicians and Surgeons v American Board of PodiatricSurgery, Inc, 185 F3d 606, 613 (6th Cir 1999); McNeil-PPC,Inc v
Pfizer Inc, 351 F Supp 2d 226, 249 (SDNY 2005). Courts applying the FTC Act do not
always require extrinsic evidence, determining in some cases that "the FTC's unique expertise and experience regarding consumer expectations allows it to determine for itself
the level of substantiation consumers expect to support an advertising claim." Sandoz
PharmaceuticalsCorp, 902 F2d at 229. See also Thompson Medical Co v Federal Trade
Commission, 791 F2d 189, 196 (DC Cir 1986).
123 See Federal Trade Commission v Cyberspace.com, LLC, 453 F3d 1196, 1201 (9th
Cir 2006).
124 See id; Thompson Medical Co, 791 F2d at 197.
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apply the usual framework to assess whether competitors are
entitled to redress for false or misleading off-label claims. But it
is not immediately clear that the same can be said for the government's consumer-protection suits brought under the FDCA.
The FDCA prohibits false or misleading speech about prescription drugs because such speech can lead doctors to prescribe
drugs that are unsafe or ineffective.125 Unlike in the Lanham Act
context, the focus of lawsuits brought under the FDCA is to ensure public health and safety. Thus, the key question for courts
determining whether to apply the false advertising framework
to off-label speech is whether the likelihood that a reasonable
physician will be materially misled by an off-label claim is a reliable metric for distinguishing between speech that creates
such safety risks and speech that may advance the state of medical science.126 This Section demonstrates that a definition of
"false or misleading" that is predicated on physician judgment is
consistent with the FDCA's goal of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness.
1. The FDCA defines drug "safety and effectiveness" in
relative, not absolute terms.
Drug safety and effectiveness are not self-defining concepts.
As the clinical trial process illustrates, "safe and effective" in the
FDCA context refers to a level of confidence about underlying
scientific facts that is sufficient to warrant FDA approval of a
new drug.127 Federal regulations require drug companies to conduct an elaborate series of "well-controlled" clinical trials to generate comprehensive data about drug safety and effectiveness.128
The first two phases of clinical trials are centered on generating
data on drug toxicity and side effects; the FDA gives limited
weight to the effectiveness question until the third phase of

125 See Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress Had
Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promotion of PrescriptionDrugs, 58 Food
& Drug L J 299, 300-01 (2003). The centrality of drug safety and efficacy is the dominant theme of the FDA's drug-advertising regulations. See, for example, 21 CFR
§ 202.1(e).
126 See Part I.B.3.
127 See notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
128 See 21 USC § 355(d) (requiring drugmakers to provide "data from [an] adequate
and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory evidence" to demonstrate that
drugs proposed for FDA approval are effective); 21 CFR § 314.126(a) (specifying requirements that clinical investigations must satisfy to be considered "adequate and wellcontrolled"). See also Drug Development and Review Definitions (cited in note 17).
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trials, when a drug has already passed these threshold tests.12 9
Before each trial stage, the drugmaker and the FDA select met130
rics
(called endpoints) that are probative of the drug's risks
and benefits.131 The relevant endpoints vary by drug, based on
what measurements the FDA and drugmaker deem appropriate
for the particular uses and patient populations being studied. 132
It is important to distinguish the measurements of drug
safety and effectiveness obtained in clinical trials from the legal
definition of "safe and effective." Though the FDCA sets forth a
highly structured framework for measuring safety and effectiveness, neither the statute's text nor its regulations establish a uniform standard for what constitutes a "safe" or "effective" drug.
Rather, the legal definition of "safe and effective" invokes the
overall risk-benefit profile of the drug-whether the benefits that
13
the drug promises justify the risks that it poses to patients.1
2. Safety and effectiveness are a matter of physician
judgment.
Though the FDCA charges the FDA with the task of ensuring
that a new drug possesses a favorable balance of risks and benefits for at least one clinical use, 134 the statute otherwise explicitly
reserves to physicians the task of weighing drug risks and benefits when recommending prescriptions to their patients.135 The
FDCA states that it does not "limit or interfere with the authority
of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally
marketed [drug] for any condition or disease within a legitimate
health care practitioner-patient relationship."' 136 As the Supreme
129 See Drug Development and Review Definitions (cited in note 17). The three-stage
process consists of Phase I studies that establish that the drug is nontoxic in healthy
volunteers; Phase II studies that generate preliminary data on drug effectiveness and
demonstrate the drug's clinical characteristics, such as side effects; and Phase III studies
that provide comprehensive safety-effectiveness data in a realistic patient population.
See id.
130 21 USC § 355(b)(5)(B) (providing that NDA applicants may make "a reasonable
written request for a meeting [with the FDA] for the purpose of reaching agreement on
the design and size of clinical trials").
131 See Drug Development and Review Definitions (cited in note 17).
132 See 21 USC § 355(b)(5)(B).
133 See 21 USC § 355(d) (providing that FDA officials shall determine whether a
drug is sufficiently safe and effective by "implement[ing] a structured risk-benefit assessment framework in the new drug approval process to facilitate the balanced consideration of benefits and risks").
134 See 21 USC § 355(d).
135
136

See 21 USC § 396.
21 USC § 396.
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Court has held, the primacy of physician judgment extends to
off-label uses.137 The Supreme Court and lower courts have further affirmed that physicians retain the power to make prescribing decisions even though drug companies or patients might
13
seek to influence those decisions. 8
The FDA's gatekeeping authority under the premarketapproval system is best understood, then, as a limited exception
to the general rule that physicians are free to prescribe whatever drug they deem appropriate for a particular patient. The history of drug regulation confirms that the premarket-approval
process is a pragmatic concession to the realities of the drug
market. Prior to the FDCA's Drug Amendments of 1962,139
which established the modern premarket-review and clinical
trial processes, 140 the lack of entry barriers to the drug market
led to rampant false or misleading promotion. 141 The sheer volume of misleading drug claims made it difficult for busy doctors
to evaluate which drugs were safe and effective for particular
uses. 142 This problem was compounded by the fact that early
twentieth-century medical training-unlike medical training today143-did not provide most doctors with the analytical skills
required to track down and evaluate data about new drug products. 144 As a result, doctors were often forced to engage in

137

Buckman Co v Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 US 341, 350 (2001) ("'[O]ff-label'

usage ... is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate in this
area without directly interfering with the practice of medicine.").
138 See notes 75-96 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has expressed
skepticism over the idea that physicians would allow marketing or patient requests for a
drug to adversely affect their professional judgment. Thus, the Court would be unlikely
to uphold restrictions on off-label marketing (which drug companies generally communicate specifically to physicians), even if the public did become aware of drug companies'
claims. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc,
425 US 748, 766-69 (1976).
139 Pub L No 87-781, 76 Stat 780, codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq.
140 See Drug Amendments of 1962, § 102(c), 76 Stat at 781, codified at 21 USC § 355
(requiring drug manufacturers to demonstrate drug safety and efficacy by "substantial
evidence ... consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved"). See also 21 USC § 355(d).
141 See Waxman, 58 Food & Drug L J at 300-04 (cited in note 125).
142 See id at 301-03.
143 See Maria A. Blanco, et al, A Survey Study of Evidence-Based Medicine Training
in US and CanadianMedical Schools, 102 J Med Library Assoc 160, 163 (2014) (listing
examples of modern evidence-based-medicine tools used to formally train medical
students).
144 See Drug Industry Act of 1962, S Rep No 87-1744, 87th Cong, 2d Sess 37 (1962),
reprinted in 1962 USCCAN 2884, 2902 ("Leading physicians testified that it is impossible
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guesswork, which led them to prescribe harmful or ineffective
drugs. 14 Congress instituted the premarket-approval process to
control this deluge of false and misleading claims and to ensure
that physicians would have a sound factual basis for evaluating
a drug's risks and benefits.
The introduction of the structured clinical trial process decreased the volume of spurious claims by permitting drugmakers to market only those substances that had been proven safe
and effective for a clinical use. 146 As a result, the risks of off-label
prescribing are significantly lower today than they were in the
past. Any drug that is the subject of off-label marketing has, by
definition, already been deemed safe through the clinical trial
process-so only drug effectiveness is at stake in off-label
cases. 147 Moreover, the consolidation of the pharmaceutical industry since the Drug Amendments of 1962 has decreased the
incentives for false or misleading promotion: unlike the numerous small operations of the mid-twentieth century, 14 8 today's
drug companies are repeat players with reputations to protect. 149
Thus, the clinical trial and regulatory processes ease physicians' assessments of drug risks and benefits in two ways. First,
the clinical trial process ensures that all drugs come with a
comprehensive safety profile that details what tests have and
have not been done, in addition to the results of those tests. Second, the process cabins the drug market to only those drugs
proven to have positive health effects that justify their risks, ensuring that drug companies cannot market inert substances as
efficacious cures. These limitations-though they do reduce the
number of drugs that doctors can prescribe-ensure that physicians have information of sufficient quantity and quality to exercise their professional judgment in making off-label prescribing

to keep currently informed of the state of medical knowledge to be found scattered in
hundreds of medical journals on the 400 new drugs introduced each year.").
145 See id.
146 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 Va L Rev 1753, 1764-66 (1996).
147 See notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
148 See Drug Industry Antitrust Act, Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee
(Subcommittee No 5) of the Committee on the Judiciaryon HR 6245, 87th Cong, 2d Sess
212 (1962) ("1962 Drug Industry Hearings") (statement of Dr. Martin Cherkasky) (discussing the role of mid-twentieth-century "detailmen"-individual drug advertisers who
provided physicians with various promotional materials).
149 See Howard Bauchner and Phil B. Fontanarosa, Restoring Confidence in the
PharmaceuticalIndustry, 309 JAMA 607, 607 (2013) (describing the various reputational concerns of large pharmaceutical companies today).
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decisions. In this way, the regulatory system supports and preserves the FDCA's commitment to physician primacy in making
judgments about safety and effectiveness.
3. Speech is false or misleading if it undermines
physicians' judgments about safety and effectiveness.
The centrality of physician judgment to pharmaceutical
regulation is evident from Congress's decision to preserve physician discretion, even as it instituted the clinical trial process as
a gold standard for substantiating drug claims. 15o To the extent
practicable, the regulatory regime is designed to allow physicians to make the ultimate judgment about whether a drug's
risk-benefit profile is suitable for a given patient.151 In other
words, a drug is "safe and effective" for a patient if a physician,
in her professional judgment, says that it is.
Since physicians are responsible for deciding which drugs to
prescribe, theirs is the relevant judgment to consider when determining whether an off-label marketing claim makes false or
misleading statements about safety and effectiveness.152 A physician's ability to decide which drugs are safe and effective improves if she is provided with true and nonmisleading information. Conversely, speech that is false or misleading impedes a
physician's ability to make such decisions, causing physicians to
prescribe unsafe or ineffective drugs.

III. ADOPTING THE FALSE ADVERTISING STATUTES' DEFINITION
OF "FALSE OR MISLEADING" FOR OFF-LABEL MARKETING

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, false or misleading off-label speech compromises patient health and safety only
if it interferes with physicians' prescribing decisions. Thus, the
effect of off-label speech on physicians' ability to make informed
prescribing decisions is an appropriate metric for distinguishing
false or misleading off-label speech from potentially valuable
communication. The analogy to the false advertising framework
See Klasmeier and Redish, 37 Am J L & Med at 323 (cited in note 25).
151 See id.
152 Note that this is true even though information about off-label uses makes its way
into the popular media. See notes 189-92 and accompanying text. See also Benrus Watch
Co v Federal Trade Commission, 352 F2d 313, 319-20 (8th Cir 1965) (determining that,
when the buyer of a product is not a member of the product's targeted audience, the buyer's reasonable perception of advertisements for the product nevertheless determines
whether the advertisement was unlawfully deceptive).
150
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is clear. Under the false advertising statutes, an advertising
claim is false or misleading if it causes a reasonable consumer to
make a different purchasing decision than she would otherwise
have made in the face of complete and accurate information
about the advertised product. 153 Similarly, an off-label statement
is false or misleading if it leads a reasonable physician to make
a different prescribing decision than she would otherwise have
made in the face of complete and accurate information about the
promoted prescription drug.
Because this metric for evaluating off-label speech is so
closely related to that used in the well-established false advertising framework, this Part argues that courts should adopt the
approach used for the false advertising statutes as a universal
framework for identifying false or misleading off-label speech.
Section A describes the practical benefits of adopting this approach: the deployment of a familiar and tested framework for
evaluating health claims, and the establishment of a consistent
definition across statutory contexts. Section B explains how the
false advertising approach would give drug companies incentives not only to minimize false or misleading off-label speech
but also to maximize dissemination of truthful off-label speech.
Finally, Section C describes how courts should adapt and apply
the approach in the off-label marketing context.
A.

Practical Benefits of the False Advertising Framework
1. The false advertising approach is a tested framework for
evaluating health claims.

The false
advertising statutes' unfair-and-deceptiveadvertising provisions are a tested approach to identifying false
or misleading drug claims. The FTC has regulated false advertising of nonprescription drugs and supplements by applying this
framework under the FTC Act for over seventy-five years. 5 4 In
fact, the FTC long regulated prescription drug advertisements as

153 See Federal Trade Commission v Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F3d 1196, 1199-1200
(9th Cir 2006).
154 See Act of Mar 21, 1938, 52 Stat 111, 114, codified as amended at 15 USC § 52(a)
(giving the FTC the authority to regulate advertising). Under these provisions, the FTC
has some responsibilities in enforcing the Lanham Act's advertising provisions; courts
applying the Lanham Act use a virtually identical framework.

1000
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well.155 During the 1920s and 1930s, more than half the FTC's
workload consisted of policing false or misleading drug-, device-,
and cosmetic-related claims.156
Though the regulation of prescription drugs migrated to the
FDA over time, this development is best seen as the result of the
FDA's effort to maintain the integrity of its regulatory process,
rather than a judgment about the sufficiency of the FTC framework as a method for identifying false or misleading drug
claims. Perhaps most tellingly, Congress never transferred
jurisdiction over prescription drug advertising from the FTC. In
fact, Congress explicitly declined to do so: prior to passing the
FDCA, the FDA engaged in an energetic lobbying campaign to
gain jurisdiction over false advertising in this area, but Congress refused to transfer authority to the agency. 57 A variety of
cases and administrative adjudications from the years following
the FDCA's passage show that the three branches of government viewed the FTC's jurisdiction over false advertising as exclusive.158 In the ensuing years, the FDA circumvented this limitation on its authority by interpreting its authority over the
NDA and labeling processes as authority to prosecute drug companies for advertisements that tend to undermine the regulatory
process. 15 9 As a result, the FDA now exercises authority over
prescription drug promotion.
Even as the FDA obtained control over and experience with
regulating drug promotion, the FTC has maintained unbroken
authority over nonprescription drugs and medical devices. The
FTC has regularly applied the false advertising regulations to
health claims related to nutritional supplements and over-thecounter drugs.160 That Congress has not transferred regulatory
authority over the advertising of these items to the FDAdespite the agency's subject matter expertise and growing experience regulating advertising-demonstrates the success of the

155 See Terry S. Coleman, Originsof the Prohibitionagainst Off-Label Promotion, 69
Food & Drug L J 161, 168 (2014).
156 See id.
157 See id at 175-76.
158 See id at 180-81, 194.
159 See Coleman, 69 Food & Drug L J at 178-93 (cited in note 155).
160 See, for example, In the Matter of Body Wise International, Inc, 120 FTC 704,
725-28 (1995) (applying the FTC Act to a claim alleging false advertising of various nutritional supplements); In the Matter of Thompson Medical Co, 104 FTC 648, 783-86
(1984) (applying the FTC Act to a claim alleging false advertising of the over-the-counter
drug Aspercreme).
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FTC framework in balancing the public's competing interests in
consumer protection and the dissemination of useful information
in the sensitive area of human health.161
2. The definition of "false or misleading" off-label speech
should be uniform under all statutes.
Courts should adopt the false advertising statutes' definition of "false or misleading" in the FDCA context in order to ensure a uniform definition of the term among the various statutory contexts that provide potential causes of action for false or
misleading off-label claims. Of the statutes that can give rise to
claims related to false or misleading off-label marketing, only
the Lanham Act-under which courts have adopted the same
framework as under the FTC Act-has a detailed framework for
identifying false or misleading promotion.162 Because, as noted
above, this is both congressionally endorsed and a wellestablished approach to evaluating health claims for nonprescription drugs, courts will likely extend this framework to Lanham Act claims related to the off-label marketing of prescription
drugs.
This false advertising framework is also likely to be a default framework for other statutes that provide causes of action
to redress financial harms caused by fraud more generally.
Though different plaintiffs will be eligible to pursue actions under different statutes, the mechanism of harm-interference
with physician judgment-is the same for all prospective complainants. For example, reimbursement agencies seeking redress through RICO can prove causation only by demonstrating
that a drugmaker's false or misleading claim actually led physicians to prescribe a more expensive drug than they otherwise

161

See Beales, 24 Seton Hall L Rev at 1380-81 (cited in note 54). Though off-label

claims admittedly require more-advanced technical analysis than a typical advertising
claim, the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 509
US 579 (1993), suggests that courts are capable of making judgments about the reliability of scientific evidence and determining whether such evidence is probative of a particular factual assertion. In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted that "federal judges possess
the capacity" to assess whether scientific "reasoning or methodology ... is scientifically
valid and [ ] whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts"
of the case. Id at 592-93.
162 See Part II.A. Because the FDA, rather than the FTC, brings claims related to
consumer protection in the prescription drug context, one would not expect to see FTC
Act claims related to off-label marketing.
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would have.163 The government would need to make a similar

showing to successfully argue that a drug company defrauded
the Medicaid or Medicare system under the False Claims Act.164
Because the false advertising framework is specifically designed
to guide the assessment of whether a reasonable prescriber was
materially misled by a promotional claim,165 it is an ideal rule for

identifying fraud in the off-label marketing context.
Given that the false advertising framework will likely be
used to identify false or misleading speech under other statutes,
the government should promote uniformity by adopting the
same definition under the FDCA. A uniform definition of "false
or misleading" is desirable because plaintiffs might bring claims
under multiple statutes concurrently. For example, the DOJ
might wish to simultaneously bring claims for false or misleading speech under the FDCA and the False Claims Act. A uniform definition of false or misleading speech under both causes
of action would streamline litigation and reduce legal costs for
both the plaintiff and the defendant. Further, given that the bad
act (false or misleading speech), harm (wrong drug prescribed in
reliance on false or misleading speech), and burden of proof are
identical under each statute, adopting identical frameworks
could allow parties to invoke collateral estoppel.166 This would

both discourage frivolous claims and encourage parties injured
by off-label speech to engage in follow-on litigation, increasing
the costs of false or misleading off-label marketing.
B. Normative Benefits of the False Advertising Framework
An ideal off-label marketing statute would both encourage
drug companies to generate and deploy socially valuable information and discourage them from disseminating false or misleading information. The false advertising statutes achieve this balance through a burden-shifting framework. Under the statutes, a
163 See In re Neurontin, 712 F3d at 39-41 (finding both proximate and but-for causation satisfied under RICO when the defendant-drugmaker had fraudulently induced
physicians to prescribe Neurontin for an off-label use in higher quantities than they otherwise would have).
164 See United States v Aventis Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 512 F Supp 2d 1158, 1163 (ND
Ill 2007).
165 See McNeil-PPC,Inc v Pfizer Inc, 351 F Supp 2d 226, 248 (SDNY 2005) (requiring the plaintiff, in a case alleging false advertising under the Lanham Act, to demonstrate that the advertisements had been materially misleading to consumers).
166 See M. Stuart Madden, Issue Preclusion in Products Liability, 11 Pace L Rev 87,
96-99 (1990).
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plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that an advertiser
has made statements that elicit a material reaction from a reasonable audience member.167 Meeting this burden requires the
government to present "substantial evidence" that an advertisement, if unsubstantiated, is misleading.168 However, advertisers themselves are responsible for substantiating their
claims, either to the level of certainty claimed in the advertisement or, if no claim is stated explicitly, to an appropriate level
given the breadth of the claim.169 Since advertisers have already
generated the data that substantiate their claims,170 this scheme
lowers litigation costs relative to a scenario in which the plain171
tiff bears the exclusive burden of proof.
As a practical matter, giving drug companies the burden of
substantiating their off-label claims would both deter deceptive
off-label marketing and promote truthful off-label marketing
more effectively than placing the burden of proof exclusively on
the plaintiff.172 Under an arbitrary effectiveness standard (including a per se ban), a drug company's decision to assert a
claim is a function of the expected value of making the claim in
terms of increased prescriptions, discounted by the likelihood of

167 For cases describing the burden of proof under the Lanham Act, see Pizza Hut,
Inc v Papa John's International,Inc, 227 F3d 489, 495 (5th Cir 2000); American Council
of Certified PodiatricPhysicians and Surgeons v American Board of Podiatric Surgery,
Inc, 185 F3d 606, 614 (6th Cir 1999); Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 960 F2d 294, 299 (2d Cir 1992). For a case describing the burden of proof under the FTC Act, see Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 818
("[T]he Commission has the burden of showing that the material claims communicated
to reasonable consumers by the advertising are false in some manner.").
168 Removatron International Corp v Federal Trade Commission, 884 F2d 1489,
1497 (1st Cir 1989).
169 See id at 1492 n 3. See also McNeil-PPC, 351 F Supp 2d at 250-51; American
Home Products Corp v Federal Trade Commission, 695 F2d 681, 692-98 (3d Cir 1982).
170 See FTC Policy Statement regardingAdvertising Substantiation (Federal Trade
Commission, Mar 11, 1983), archived at http://perma.cc/75AP-FBRR.
171 See Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney, Truth and Consequences: The
Federal Trade Commission's Ad SubstantiationProgram, 6 Intl Rev L & Econ 151, 153
(1986) (discussing how standards of proof affect information-gathering costs in litigation). Importantly, it seems unlikely that this lower burden of proof would lead to significantly more litigation. If an advertising claim is found to be misleading or nonmisleading
for a particular population of physicians, then presumably estoppel would apply to
future allegations about the same advertising claim.
172 See id at 157-58 (finding that shifting the burden of proof onto drug companies
enabled the FTC "to challenge the accuracy of more [advertising] claims per budgetary
dollar").
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an enforcement action. 173 Assuming that the likelihood of an enforcement action does not depend on the veracity of the drug
claims (because the ban applies to any claims related to off-label
marketing, whether true or false), drug companies are encouraged to design claims that will maximize the number of new
prescriptions-a goal that is not necessarily aligned with patient
interests. By contrast, the false advertising statutes' framework
makes patient interests an inherent part of the expected value
of an off-label campaign. Because the likelihood of an enforcement action is directly related to the veracity of the claims, a
drug company could minimize the enforcement "discount" of an
off-label campaign by making only truthful, nonmisleading
claims.
The incentive for drug companies to police their off-label
communications for false or misleading speech is an important
feature of the false advertising approach. Because drug marketing often takes place in private, outside the view of FDA regulators, misleading claims can be difficult for the agency to detect. 174 Moreover, there can be a substantial delay before
practitioners recognize the misleading nature of a drug claim
during the time when evidence about safety and effectiveness is
accumulating.75 By setting appropriate ex ante incentives, the
false advertising approach ensures that patients can access valuable off-label information without an enhanced risk of receiving
false or misleading information, relative to the current per
se ban.
Importantly, the flexibility of the false advertising approach
should not be confused with the uncertainty that prevails under
the current scientific-exchange framework.176 The false advertising
approach, though flexible with respect to the range of potentially

173 See Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as a
Good or Bad, 108 Q J Econ 941, 945 (1993) (explaining why a producer's advertising
output is in part a function of advertising costs and expected returns on revenue).
174 See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michelle M. Mello, and David M. Studdert, Strategies
and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of Pharmaceuticals:A Retrospective Analysis of
Whistleblower Complaints, 8 PLOS Medicine 1, 2 (Apr 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/
VQ73-77DG. For a historical perspective on the difficulties faced in identifying false advertising, see 1962 Drug Industry Hearings, 87th Cong, 2d Sess at 214-15 (cited in
note 148).
175 See 1962 Drug Industry Hearings,87th Cong, 2d Sess at 173 (cited in note 148)
(statement of Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) (describing the delays and difficulties in obtaining research results to verify whether drug advertisements are false or misleading).
176 See Part I.B.3.
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acceptable studies and claims, provides a definite requirement:
an off-label claim must be an accurate representation of the underlying data. In contrast, the high-and somewhat indefinitestandard for scientific exchange encourages drug companies to
forgo opportunities to investigate new uses if the value of making claims about those uses does not exceed the cost of conducting studies that meet the expected high requirements.
Thus, the false advertising approach not only ensures that
drug companies have reduced incentives to make false or misleading statements but also gives the companies sufficient in177
centives to generate useful information about off-label use.
Just as the strict substantiation requirement allows off-label research to drive drug claims, the desire to make off-label claims
may drive the decision to conduct off-label research.18 The precision of the false advertising approach thus minimizes the costs
required to support off-label claims and maximizes the range of
claims for which it is profitable to generate truthful and nonmisleading information.179 This is important because drug companies' decisions about whether to pursue drug research are ultimately informed by the monetary return on that research.180
Research is profitable when it leads doctors to write prescriptions that generate revenues that exceed research costs.18 Under the false advertising approach, drug companies would be
motivated to perform whatever amount of research is required
to substantiate a valuable claim-that is, a claim that would
prompt the population of reasonable physicians to write a profitable number of prescriptions.182 Since reasonable physicians
will write only socially valuable prescriptions, pharmaceutical

177 See Paul H. Rubin, From Bad to Worse: Recent FDA Initiatives and Consumer
Health, in Richard T. Kaplar, ed, Bad Prescriptionfor the FirstAmendment: FDA Censorship of Drug Advertising and Promotion 87, 88-90 (Media Institute 1993) (noting that
drug companies have an incentive to make reliable, appropriately qualified claims about
their products).
178 See id.

179 See Beales, 24 Seton Hall L Rev at 1381 (cited in note 54).
180 See Anup Malani, Oliver Bembom, and Mark van der Laan, Improving the FDA
Approval Process *2 (University of Chicago Law & Economics John M. Olin Working
Paper No 580, Oct 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/PBW6-5ZUL.
181 See id.
182 See Charles J. Walsh and Alissa Pyrich, FDA Efforts to Control the Flow of In-

formation at PharmaceuticalIndustry-Sponsored Medical Education Programs:A Regulatory Overdose, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 1325, 1366 (1994). See also Malani, Bembom, and
van der Laan, Improving the FDA Approval Process at *2 (cited in note 180).
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companies have an incentive to generate socially valuable in18 3
formation about off-label uses.
C.

Adapting and Applying the False Advertising Framework to
Off-Label Marketing

As the preceding sections show, there are obvious practical
and normative advantages to adopting the false advertising
statutes' framework for identifying false or misleading speech in
the context of off-label-marketing suits brought under other
statutes. Through careful application of this framework, courts
can ensure consumer protection without curtailing useful advertising. This Section describes how, specifically, courts should
apply the framework in the off-label marketing context.
To find an advertisement false or misleading under the
Lanham or FTC Acts, a court must be convinced that the advertisement misrepresents the facts in a way that is likely to materially mislead a reasonable consumer. 8 4 Generally, courts approach the analysis in three steps. First, the court defines a
"reasonable consumer" for the advertisement. Then, the court
asks whether that consumer would take material action based
on the advertisement.185 If the reasonable consumer would take
material action based on the advertisement, then the court must
finally determine whether the underlying advertisement is deceptive. If the advertisement is deceptive, then the claim is actionably misleading, because it fooled a reasonable consumer into acting on it. 186
Using GlaxoSmithKline's marketing of Wellbutrin as an illustrative example, the following sections describe how courts
currently approach each of these steps and how this analysis
could be adapted to the off-label-marketing context. The first
section describes how courts characterize the "reasonable consumer" under the false advertising statutes, explains why the
"reasonable physician" is the relevant consumer in the off-label
marketing context, and highlights how courts might assess the
reasonable physician's abilities and tendencies. The second
183 See Malani, Bembom, and van der Laan, Improving the FDA Approval Process at
*3-4 (cited in note 180).
184 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception (cited in note 121). See also Federal
Trade Commission v Tashman, 318 F3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir 2003); McNeil-PPC, 351 F
Supp 2d at 248.
185 See Cyberspace.com, 453 F3d at 1201.
186 See id.
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section explains how courts evaluate materiality and illustrates
how this approach could be adapted to determine whether physicians would make a material decision based on an off-label
claim. The third section describes how courts discern whether a
scientific claim is deceptive under the false advertising statutes
and proposes specific inquiries for the off-label-marketing context.
1. Step one: defining the "reasonable consumer."
Under the false advertising statutes, a statement cannot be
deceptive unless, given all the circumstances, it is likely to mislead a reasonable member of the target audience for the advertisement.187 To determine whether a statement meets these requirements, a court must first identify the characteristics of a
reasonable audience member. Courts typically begin by determining which individuals comprise the target audience, based
on the type of product being advertised.188 Courts also consider
the groups to which the advertising is targeted.'8 9 The targeted
group is generally determined based on context, 190 but direct evidence of an advertiser's intent may also be probative. 191 Under the
false advertising framework, when advertising is targeted toward
192
only experts, their perception of the advertisement governs.
Applying these analyses to the prescription drug context is
straightforward. Under the false advertising statutes, the relevant consumer is the individual who makes the decision about
which product to consume, not the individual who ultimately uses the product.193 In the prescription drug context, US law treats
physicians as the decisionmakers. In nearly all US jurisdictions,
doctors are considered "learned intermediaries" who are responsible for deciding which treatment options their patients should
187 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception (cited in note 121). See also Tashman,
318 F3d at 1277.
188 See, for example, Benrus Watch Co v Federal Trade Commission, 352 F2d 313,
319 (8th Cir 1965) (analyzing a claim alleging that certain watches were falsely advertised by considering the advertisements' effects on watch purchasers).
189 See, for example, Koch v Federal Trade Commission, 206 F2d 311, 316-18 (6th
Cir 1953) (explaining the significance of the fact that allegedly misleading advertisements had been targeted at laypersons as well as members of the medical profession).
190 See id.
191 See, for example, In re Neurontin, 712 F3d at 27-28 (summarizing a drugmaker's
internal documents demonstrating direct intent to market a pharmaceutical product to
physicians and third-party payers).
192 See Koch, 206 F2d at 316.
193 See H. Thomas Austern, What Is "UnfairAdvertising"?, 26 Food, Drug, Cosmetic
L J 659, 663 (1971).
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pursue. 94 In the on-label context, these jurisdictions hold that
drug manufacturers have a duty to warn only members of the
medical profession about product risks, even though pharmaceutical companies may sometimes engage in direct-to-consumer
advertising.195 Because the law treats licensed medical professionals as responsible for making prescribing decisions, they are
the only audience members who can take material action based
on advertising claims. Applying this to the off-label context, the
audience for an off-label claim should thus include any medical
professional who makes prescribing decisions.196 A court might
choose to define the audience even more narrowly if the evidence
suggests that a drug company directed its off-label claims
toward particular classes of physicians.
After defining the target audience for a company's off-label
marketing, the court would next characterize that audience in
terms of the typical member's ability to weigh off-labelmarketing claims. Relevant criteria in this context could include
advanced training, whether the physicians' prescribing habits
indicate familiarity and comfort with the standard of care for
the illness at issue, and the extent to which treatment standards
are evolving. For example, specialized medications like those
used in oncology or psychiatry might be advertised to only a highly trained subset of physicians who are working on the cutting
edge of medical science and regularly consider new treatments.
The facts of the Wellbutrin case illustrate how this two-part
inquiry would work. 197 The government's complaint does not
specify whether GlaxoSmithKline's marketing was directed toward particular groups of practitioners. This is unsurprising: it
is in the complainant's interest to suggest an inclusive definition
of the target audience for the off-label statements. 198 Had the
194 Diane Schmauder Kane, Construction and Application of Learned-Intermediary
Doctrine, 57 ALR5th § 2(a) at 29 (West 1998).
195 See id at § 2(a) at 26.
196 See David M. Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the
FDA Needs to Seek More, rather than Less, Speech from Drug Manufacturers on OffLabel Drug Treatments, 9 Mich St J Med & L 315, 355 (2005) ("As long as the prescribing physician remains in charge of the 'purchase' decision for prescription drugs-the
issue of whether scientific information regarding off-label uses of prescription drugs is
misleading or not is properly focused on the prescribing physician.")
197 See notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
198 For an example of how audience composition influences the reasonableness analysis,
see Koch, 206 F2d at 316-17 (setting forth different reasonableness standards depending
on whether the targeted audience consisted of members of the medical profession or laypersons).
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case progressed to trial, GlaxoSmithKline would likely have presented evidence demonstrating the sophistication of the physicians who received the pertinent off-label claims-for example,
by presenting evidence that the firm invited only specialists to
its seminars and sales calls.
Assuming that the United States had successfully argued
that GlaxoSmithKline's off-label claims were directed toward
general practitioners as well as specialists-that is, all physicians-the court would next have examined the ability of general practitioners to weigh claims about Wellbutrin. The court
would have noted that general practitioners commonly treat
straightforward cases of depression and are familiar with the
range of antidepressants that are substitutes for Wellbutrin. On
the other hand, general practitioners habitually refer severe
cases of depression to experts in psychiatry. 199 Thus, a reasonable member of the physician audience could be expected to consider off-label claims in the context of routine, low-risk cases but
would be hesitant to implement innovative and risky new
treatment options in more-severe cases. The court would have
considered these tendencies and capabilities in its subsequent
materiality analysis.
2. Step two: assessing materiality.
Once the audience for an advertising claim has been defined, a court must determine whether a reasonable member of
that audience is likely to take a material action based on the allegedly misleading advertisement-that is, in this setting, to
make a prescribing decision based on it.2 o0 Under the FTC Act, a
reasonable audience member's interpretation of a claim could
depend on factors such as the range of possible interpretations
of the advertisement and the plausibility of those interpretations, the context in which the claims are made or transmitted,

199 See E.S. Paykel and R.G. Priest, Recognition and Management of Depression in
General Practice:Consensus Statement, 305 Brit Med J 1198, 1201-02 (1992); Harold E.
Bronheim, et al, The Academy of PsychosomaticMedicine Practice Guidelines for Psychiatric Consultationin the GeneralMedical Setting, 39 Psychosomatics S8, S12-13 (1998).
200 See In the Matter of Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 FTC 1282, 1290 (1963). See also FTC
Policy Statement on Deception (cited in note 121).
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and the overall presentation of the information.21 Courts evaluate these factors in light of market realities.202
The market realities relevant to the materiality of off-label
promotion can be divided into two broad categories. First, courts
must consider the regulatory, legal, and factual context in which
physicians receive off-label promotions. Second, courts must
consider the conditions under which members of the relevant
audience practice medicine: the kinds of cases to which the physicians might apply what they learn, and what other information is available to help them make prescribing decisions.203
The ensuing discussion considers how courts would assess each
of these market realities in this context.
a) Regulatory, legal, and factual circumstancespertinent
to materiality. In the off-label marketing context, the task of determining a reasonable physician's reaction to off-label marketing is complicated by the fact that the realities of pharmaceutical marketing will likely depend on how the FDA and courts
treat off-label marketing in the future. Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Caronia, courts presumed off-label marketing
to be illegal.204 Nevertheless, one can infer from the damage estimates included in off-label-marketing settlement agreements-which are correlated with the number of prescriptions
attributable to off-label marketing205-that off-label marketing
campaigns influence many physicians' prescribing decisions.
It is not clear whether physicians' reactions to off-label promotions reflect their professional assessment of the risks and
benefits of prescribing a particular drug for an off-label use, or
whether physicians mistakenly believe that the drug companies'

See FTC Policy Statement on Deception (cited in note 121).
See id (indicating that whether "market incentives place strong constraints on
the likelihood of deception" may factor into the determination of whether an advertisement is likely to materially mislead a reasonable consumer).
203 See, for example, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp v Richardson-Vicks, Inc, 902
F2d 222, 225 (3d Cir 1990) (considering whether pediatricians would find an advertisement for a children's cough syrup to be "misleading," given evidence proffered about pediatricians' training and medical practice).
204 See Part I.C.i.
205 See, for example, GSK Press Release (cited in note 3); Press Release, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (US Department of Justice, Sept 2, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/472Q-K4XG; Press Release,
Eli Lilly and Company to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (US Department of Justice, Jan 15, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/UGJ5-X4HH.
201

202
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claims are FDA approved.206 In the latter case, the claims' illegality likely contributes to physicians' misconceptions-because
off-label claims are illegal, physicians will likely expect that
sales claims are either on label or reflect the results of a wellperformed study that meets the requirements of the FDA's scientific-exchange exception to the de facto ban on off-label
marketing.207 If off-label marketing were presumptively legal,
marketing claims would no longer benefit from this veneer of reliability. As a result, physicians would have more reason to
doubt such claims, making it more difficult for a claim to meet
the materiality requirement.208
Were false or misleading off-label promotion presumptively
lawful, the scope and type of claim content would be the factors
most relevant to assessing materiality. Physicians would be unlikely to interpret high-level, general claims as persuasive scientific evidence of safety and effectiveness. Thus, it is unlikely that
such claims would meet the materiality requirement.209 On the
other hand, promotional communications that purport to deliver
scientific information would be much more likely to spur material
action.210
The facts of the GlaxoSmithKline case provide an illustrative
example. A court would not interpret a drug representative's
claim that Wellbutrin is a "happy, horny, skinny pill211 as material to a reasonable physician's prescribing decision, because no
reasonable physician would interpret a vague slogan as a scientific
206 See Kesselheim, Mello, and Studdert, Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of Pharmaceuticalsat *4-5 (cited in note 174).
207 See Simeon Management Corp v Federal Trade Commission, 579 F2d 1137, 1145

(9th Cir 1978).
208 See FDA Guidance on Scientific Exchange at *2-3 (cited in note 58).
209 Note that this is true even if the audience member were to make a decision consistent with the marketing goal: though the claim might prompt the audience to investigate the data supporting that decision, reasonable audience members would make a prescribing decision only if the results of the investigation supported it. Thus, the claim
itself would add negligible support compared to what already exists in the market. For
this reason, courts applying the FTC Act have been hesitant to sanction companies for
making general claims about product performance absent evidence that the advertiser
intended to deceive consumers. See, for example, In the Matter of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 81 FTC 398, 460-62 (1972) (finding that naming a tire "Safety Champion" did not
amount to misleading advertising under the FTC Act, because the name was too general
to be understood as a safety claim). See also Vincent N. Palladino, Lanham Act "False
Advertising" Claims: What Is a Plaintiffto Do?, 101 Trademark Rptr 1601, 1630 (2011)
(suggesting that a trivial misrepresentation would not influence purchasing decisions).
210 For an example from the FTC context, see National Commission on Egg Nutrition v Federal Trade Commission, 570 F2d 157, 163-64 (7th Cir 1977).
211 GSK Complaint at *19 (cited in note 1).
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description of the drug's effects.212 On the other hand, a court would
expect a reasonable physician to rely on the factual accuracy of the
data and scientific conclusions presented in GlaxoSmithKline's
seminars, marketing materials, and publications.
b) Medical considerations relevant to materiality. The
materiality analysis would require courts to determine how a
reasonable physician would evaluate whether the expected benefits of a medication outweigh the costs, taking into account the
unique circumstances of specific cases. 213 In this context, the realities of medical practice are highly relevant to the materiality
analysis. As a first step to analyzing a reasonable physician's
reaction to an off-label claim, courts must identify the kinds of
cases to which the physician might apply the information.214
Physicians may encounter wide variation in risk-benefit preferences, even among patients with similar illnesses. For example,
a patient with a poor prognosis or severe symptoms might be
willing to tolerate a high risk of adverse side effects in order to
try a new treatment. 215 Since a claim's materiality may differ
among distinct patient populations, it is necessary for courts to
assess materiality for both high-risk and low-risk scenarios.
For each scenario, courts would also need to consider how
great a role the off-label claim plays in a reasonable physician's
overall prescribing analysis, given the norms of medical practice.216 As the FDCA's explicit endorsement of physicians' prescribing decisions2 17 and common law's "learned intermediary"

212 The FTC has noted that a statement is not materially misleading if it is made
under circumstances in which the target audience should understand the representation
to be puffery. See Clorox Co Puerto Rico v Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co, 228 F3d 24,
38 (1st Cir 2000). "Puffery is an exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad,
vague, and commendatory language." Castrol Inc v Pennzoil Co, 987 F2d 939, 945 (3d Cir
1993).
213 Importantly, courts have substantial experience with the "reasonable physician"
standard, which is consistently invoked in medical malpractice cases. Jeffrey A. Van
Detta, Dialogue with a Neurosurgeon: Toward a D6pecage Approach to Achieve Tort Reform and Preserve Corrective Justice in Medical Malpractice Cases, 71 U Pitt L Rev 1, 68
n 150 (2009).
214 See Palladino, 101 Trademark Rptr at 1626-31 (cited in note 209) (describing
how consumer reliance is assessed).
215 See Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman, Food and Drug Law at 729 (cited in note 15).
216 False advertising cases generally consider advertising norms when assessing
materiality. See, for example, Everest Capital Ltd v Everest Funds Management, LLC,
393 F3d 755, 763-64 (8th Cir 2005) (holding that an advertisement was not likely to be
material to purchasing decisions in light of evidence showing that it did not tend to deceive the relevant consumer population).
217 See Part II.B.2.
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tradition suggest, 218 doctors are sophisticated decisionmakers
who engage in a multipronged analysis when evaluating medical
claims.219 The rise of evidence-based medicine-the "conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients"22°--in medical schools and medical practice over the past twenty years has
made critical evaluation of scientific evidence a regular part of
medical practice.221
Numerous databases, clinical reference tools, and journals
devoted specifically to meta-analysis of scientific evidence about
medical treatments are available to help doctors independently
evaluate drug-marketing claims.222 Such resources develop content in response to prescribing habits and, as such, are likely to
identify key off-label prescribing trends.23 The availability of
these tools, combined with widespread concern about the veracity of drug-marketing claims that is described in both the medical224 and popular25 press, suggests that a reasonable physician
would prescribe a drug based on an off-label claim only after
consulting such tools as needed.
Consider, for example, a reasonable general practitioner
who learned about off-label uses of Wellbutrin through a
GlaxoSmithKline sales call or seminar.226 In assessing the offlabel information's materiality, a court would first consider the
types of cases in which the general practitioner might have occasion to use the information.227 If most prescribing physicians are
simply deciding whether to prescribe Wellbutrin or an otherwise
218
219

See text accompanying note 194.
See Comments on Submissions concerning First Amendment Issues FDA Docket

No 02N-0209 *5 n 6 (Washington Legal Foundation, Oct 28, 2002), archived at
http://perma.cc/XQ3G-NLK2. See also generally Evidence-Based Medicine Working
Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine,
268 JAMA 2420 (1992).
220 David L. Sackett, et al, Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't,
312 Brit Med J 71, 71 (1996).
221 See Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) Resources (Dartmouth Biomedical Libraries), archived at http://perma.cc/DH9H-MY43.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See Howard Brody, The Company We Keep: Why PhysiciansShould Refuse to See
PharmaceuticalRepresentatives, 3 Annals Fam Med 82, 83 (2005).
225 See, for example, Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, NY Times Magazine 64 (Nov 25,
2007) (detailing the author's experience as a paid drug representative in order to call
into question the neutrality and reliability of information distributed through drug companies' promotional campaigns).
226 See text accompanying notes 198-99.
227 See Palladino, 101 Trademark Rptr at 1629-30 (cited in note 209).
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equally suitable alternative, receiving information about
GlaxoSmithKline's small-scale Wellbutrin studies might lead
a doctor to prescribe Wellbutrin rather than the alternative.221
For example, a doctor assessing a new patient with mild depression stemming from a gambling addiction might, on the
margin, elect to prescribe Wellbutrin rather than the alternative antidepressant Prozac. In such a case, the court would
find that GlaxoSmithKline's claims had a material effect on
the doctor's decisions.
If the typical case were more complex, however, the court's
analysis would also involve a deeper investigation of the offlabel claims' actual impact on physicians' prescribing decisions.
Given the reasonable general practitioner's aversion to high-risk
and innovative treatments, most physicians would seek additional information before prescribing Wellbutrin for a new use.
If that is the case, the court would also assess how much weight
the physician would give to GlaxoSmithKline's off-label claims
in light of the other informational sources that the reasonable
physician would consider.229 For example, before suggesting that
patients switch to Wellbutrin from an alternative drug, the physician might peruse the professional literature for more information about her peers' experiences with Wellbutrin. If the literature provided ample support for the decision to switch the
patient's medication-such as independent studies substantiating
Wellbutrin's off-label claims, indications that the risks of switching to Wellbutrin were low, or strong anecdotal evidence from respected experts-the court could conclude that GlaxoSmithKline's
off-label claims did nothing more than prompt physicians to
check the literature. In that case, the court would find the offlabel claims immaterial.
3. Step three: identifying misrepresentation.
If a court applying the false advertising statutes finds that a
reasonable member of the target audience for the advertisement
would take material action based on an allegedly misleading

228 For an example of such an analysis, see Osmose, Inc v Viance, LLC, 612 F3d
1298, 1319 (11th Cir 2010) ("In order to establish materiality, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 'the defendant's deception is likely to influence the purchasing decision."').
229 For an example of such an analysis, see SuntreeTechnologies, Inc v Ecosense International,Inc, 693 F3d 1338, 1349 (11th Cir 2012) (distnissing a false advertising claim
partly because members of the intended audience did not make decisions based on the
advertising).
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advertisement, then the court next determines whether the advertising claim indeed misrepresents the facts.230 To resolve
whether a claim misrepresents the facts, courts must first determine what the facts are and then decide whether the advertising claim accurately represents them. This is particularly
challenging in cases involving the interpretation of scientific data, which are probabilistic.231 Courts address this issue by assessing whether scientific data are true and provide a "reasonable basis" for an advertising claim.232
To reach this reasonable-basis finding under the false advertising statutes, a court determining whether an advertisement is misleading must first examine the factual basis for the
claim. In the context of off-label marketing, scientific tests provide the relevant factual basis. To avoid a finding of misrepresentation, an advertiser must demonstrate that reliable scientific tests produced the data that support the claim.233 Courts
determine the reliability of scientific tests by considering whether the pertinent study was conducted using a scientifically acceptable methodology,234 by qualified experts, 235 and in a manner
that reflects the actual conditions of consumer use. 236 If the underlying scientific tests are reliable, courts then ask whether the
data are adequate to support the claim.237 To do so, courts consider whether the advertising claim accurately characterizes the

230 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception (cited in note 121). A claim can misrepresent facts by stating a claim that the advertiser knows to be either unsupported by research or affirmatively false. See Federal Trade Commission v National Urological
Group, Inc, 645 F Supp 2d 1167, 1190 (ND Ga 2008).
231 See Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 214 (Basic
Books 1993) ("Science does search for absolute and immutable truths. The search does
progress. But it does not end.").
232 Federal Trade Commission v Pharmtech Research, Inc, 576 F Supp 294, 302
(DDC 1983). Courts consider whether the claim was substantiated at the time that it
was made. See FTC, FTC Policy Statement regardingAdvertising Substantiation(cited
in note 170) ("[A]dvertisers will not be allowed to create entirely new substantiation
simply because their prior substantiation was inadequate.").
233 See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,LP v Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer PharmaceuticalsCo, 906 F Supp 178, 182 (SDNY 1995).
234 See David Bernstein and Bruce Keller, The Law of Advertising, Marketing and
Promotions § 3.03(2) & n 20 (Law Journal 2014), citing In re Ciba Vision Corp (DAILIES
AquaComfort Plus), NAD Case No 5107 (Nov 17, 2009).
235 See Bernstein and Keller, The Law of Advertising at § 3.03(2) & n 21 (cited in
note 234), citing In re Dell Computer Corp, NAD Case No 4152 (Mar 2, 2004).
236 See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc v Clorox Co, 930 F Supp 753, 781-82 (EDNY 1996).
237 See Bernstein and Keller, The Law of Advertising at § 3.02(2) & n 20 (cited in
note 234), citing In re Bayer HealthCare,LLC, NAD Case No 5330 (May 9, 2011).
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magnitude of the effect observed28 and the statistical signifi239
cance of the results.
Sometimes an advertiser might state all this information
explicitly.240 If an advertisement provides a complete description
of the study methodology and results, the claim is necessarily an
accurate representation of the facts.241 But when an advertiser
makes a claim without providing details about all these elements, the court must determine whether the study's design and
claimed results converge to form a valid advertising claim, or
whether the claim misrepresents the facts.
The courts' false advertising jurisprudence recognizes both
explicit and implicit deceptiveness as forms of misrepresentation.242 These two forms of misrepresentation approximately map
onto "false" and "misleading" advertising. Explicitly deceptive
statements correspond to "false" off-label statements. An explicitly "false" off-label statement might involve the misstatement of a
drug's approval status or data from scientific studies.243
Conversely, implicitly deceptive advertising claims correspond to "misleading" off-label statements. Implicitly "misleading" claims are true as a matter of fact but nevertheless convey
untrue meaning.244 Federal false advertising jurisprudence highlights two types of implicitly deceptive statements. First, a literally true claim could be misleading if it causes a reasonable
member of the target audience to infer something other than the
truth.245 Second, a claim could also be misleading if it omits information that is needed to qualify or contextualize the statement. 246 This Section discusses each form of misrepresentation
in turn.

238 See Proctor & Gamble Co v Chesebrough-Pond'sInc, 747 F2d 114, 119 (2d Cir
1984).
239 See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Co, 102 FTC 21, 336 (1983), affd 738 F2d 554
(2d Cir 1984).
240 See McNeil-PPC, 351 F Supp 2d at 250-51 (finding that, when an advertising
claim makes a specific statement about the level of support for its claim, the plaintiff
"need only prove that the [studies] referred to ... were not sufficiently reliable to permit
one to conclude with reasonable certainty that they established the proposition for which
they were cited") (quotation marks omitted).
241 See id.
242 See, for example, National Urological Group, 645 F Supp 2d at 1190.
243 See PharmtechResearch, 576 F Supp at 302.
244 See Donaldson v Read Magazine, Inc, 333 US 178, 188 (1948).
245 See American Home Products,695 F2d at 696-97.
246 See Alberty v Federal Trade Commission, 182 F2d 36, 44 (DC Cir 1950).
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a) Literally true, but nevertheless misleading, claims. A
claim that is literally true may nevertheless be misleading if it
is ambiguous or otherwise misrepresents product performance. 247 In the false advertising context, courts determine
whether a claim is misleading in this way by evaluating whether
the level of scientific support for the claim is appropriate given
the claim's specificity.248 The more expansive the claim, the more
scientific support is needed to justify it.249 The type, accessibility,
and adequacy of the scientific evidence supporting the claim are
also relevant.20 If the target audience for the advertisement can
easily access and understand the underlying study data, a court
is unlikely to find that the advertiser's description misrepre1
sents the data.25
This analysis translates well to the off-label context because
courts already assess whether drug advertisements pertaining
to on-label uses are false or misleading.252 The FDCA regulations
on advertising claims require that the advertisement as a whole
be a "true statement" about drug effectiveness.253 As a baseline,
a nonmisleading statement about effectiveness must include a
specific description of both the health effects claimed254 and the
patient population to which the claim applies. 255 If an advertisement meets these requirements, courts then examine whether the advertisement is consistent with the overall weight of

247 See American Home Products, 695 F2d at 697.
248 See id at 696-97.
249 See id.
250 See id.

251 See American Home Products, 695 F2d at 696-97.
252 See, for example, id at 685-86; Bristol-Myers Co v Federal Trade Commission,
738 F2d 554, 562-63 (2d Cir 1984); Healthpoint,Ltd v Stratus Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 273
F Supp 2d 769, 792-93 (WD Tex 2001).
253 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(3)(i).
254 See 21 CFR § 202. 1(e)(3)(ii):
The information relating to effectiveness shall include specific indications for
use of the drug for purposes claimed in the advertisement; for example, when
an advertisement contains a broad claim that a drug is an antibacterial agent,
the advertisement shall name a type or types of infections and microorganisms
for which the drug is effective clinically as specifically as required, approved, or
permitted in the drug package labeling.
255 See 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(6)(i) (stating that an advertisement is misleading if it
"[c]ontains a representation or suggestion ... that a drug is . .. effective [ ] in a broader
range of conditions or patients ... than has been demonstrated by substantial evidence
or substantial clinical experience").
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experimental or clinical evidence of the drug's safety and
6
effectiveness.25
Though off-label claims may be based on a broader range of
study designs than on-label claims supported by FDA clinical
trials, the on-label advertising regulations provide useful guidance for assessing the weight of experimental evidence.257 For
example, the regulations require that a drug-advertising claim
reflects the realities of the study's design and the data collected.258 A drugmaker must ensure that a claim notes study limitations and deviations from clinical trial best practices or else accounts for these factors by reporting the study's margin of
error. 25 9 If a drugmaker chooses to include graphs and tables in
its promotional materials, these graphics must provide an accurate visual representation of the "relationships, trends, [and] differences ... among the variables or products studied."26° Finally,
statements about results must provide a sound description of
the statistical and clinical significance of the results, as well as
the variability of the underlying data.261
Returning to the Wellbutrin example, a court's first step in
applying these factors would be to ascertain what GlaxoSmithKline actually claimed.262 The government's complaint alleges, for example, that the firm promoted Wellbutrin as an effective "add-on" treatment for conditions that frequently accompany
depression.263 To determine whether the underlying data supported a broad effectiveness claim, the court would need to next address whether the studies provided adequate and controlled
measurements of improvements in these comorbid disorders, and
whether the study results were statistically significant.264 If, on
256 See 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(6).
257 The FDA's application of these regulations is evident from the '"Warning Letters"

and "Notice of Violation Letters" that the agency sends to pharmaceutical companies.
The agency maintains a public database of letters related to prescription drug promotion. See Warning Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to PharmaceuticalCompanies
(US Food and Drug Administration, Feb 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RZK5
-5VNP.
258 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(7).
259 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(7)(i)-(iii).
260 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(7)(iv).
261 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(7)(ii)-(v).
262 See, for example, American Home Products, 695 F2d at 690 (beginning a discussion of allegations that the defendant's advertisements were misleading with a thorough
analysis of what the advertisements in fact claimed).
263 GSK Complaint at *26 (cited in note 1).
264 See, for example, American Home Products, 695 F2d at 692 (assessing whether
the results underlying the defendant's claims were statistically significant).
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the other hand, GlaxoSmithKline were to state that the studies
merely suggested that Wellbutrin could be effective for accompanying medical conditions-as opposed to making a broad effectiveness claim-the court would focus its analysis on whether
the claims provided an accurate representation of the underlying data. For example, if GlaxoSmithKline's promotional materials included graphs or statistics, the court would consider
whether the firm presented the data in a consistent fashion that
accurately portrayed the strength of each individual claim.
b) Misleading omissions. An advertisement that does not
affirmatively assert a misleading claim may still mislead a reasonable consumer if it omits critical information. Typically, an
omission is deceptive because, without it, the advertising claim
is a half-truth: literally true, but lacking additional information
that is needed to qualify or contextualize the rest of the claim.265
The FTC and courts have taken the position that, in the context
of the FTC Act, an advertiser must provide all the information
that a consumer could reasonably be expected to need to evaluate the advertising claim.266
Courts distinguish between half-truths and situations in
which consumers infer something from an advertisement that is
not justified by its content. For example, in Alberty v Federal
Trade Commission,267 a drug company advertised an iron supplement as a remedy for weakness and tiredness.268 However,
the supplement was effective only for patients with irondeficiency anemia.269 The court held that the advertisement was
a half-truth, because the drug company did not disclose that the
supplement would have an effect on only those patients suffering from iron deficiency.270 The Alberty court also held, however,
that a statement is not necessarily misleading simply because it
does not contextualize a product's shortcomings.271 Thus, the
drug company in that case was not required to state in its advertisement that only a small proportion of people who experience

265

See Porter& Dietsch, Inc v Federal Trade Commission, 605 F2d 294, 306 (7th Cir

1979).
266 See, for example, Southwest Sunsites, Inc v Federal Trade Commission, 785 F2d
1431, 1438 (9th Cir 1986).
267 182 F2d 36 (DC Cir 1950).
268 Id at 37.
269 Id.
270 Id at 39.
271 Alberty, 182 F2d at 39.
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weakness and tiredness have iron-deficiency anemia.272 While an
advertiser must not omit information that makes the advertisement effectively false, it is not required to include all information that could affirmatively help consumers understand the
product.273

The FTC's approach to omissions translates well to the
FDCA off-label-marketing context. If, as in Alberty, an off-label
statement excludes information that is necessary to adequately
characterize the patient population and the use to which the
claim applies, then the underlying scientific evidence cannot
support the claim. For example, GlaxoSmithKline's claims about
Wellbutrin would have been false or misleading if they did not
clarify the metrics by which effectiveness was measured or if
they failed to note that an exclusively adult-patient population
was tested. Similarly, a statement about an off-label use would
be misleading if it failed to note pertinent limitations of the
study design or if it selectively presented information about the
nature of the clinical study or data analysis that would lead a
physician to draw incorrect conclusions about the product's effectiveness.274 A court would likely find that GlaxoSmithKline's
statements were misleading if the company did not mention the
Wellbutrin studies' small sizes and short durations.275 Similarly,
if the firm failed to incorporate the results of its follow-up studies into its claims, a court might find that the firm's selective
presentation of data constituted a misleading claim.276

272

See id.

Id.
See, for example, United States v Ninety-Five Barrels, 265 US 438, 443-44 (1924)
(determining that a manufacturer had made a misleading statement in violation of the
FDCA by misrepresenting the process by which its vinegar was produced).
275 See 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(6)(v), (xiv)-(xv) (providing that an advertisement is misleading if it mischaracterizes the scope of the studies supporting the advertiser's claims).
See also GSK Complaint at *20-21 (cited in note 1) ("GSK hired the Cooney/Waters
Group [ ], a public relations firm, to promote and publicize a GSK-funded pilot study ....
[a]lthough the pilot study included only 25 patients who were on the drug for only eight
weeks.").
276 See 21 CFR § 202.1(e)(6)(iii)-(iv) (providing that an advertisement is misleading
if it offers a selective presentation of data to support its claims).
273
274
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CONCLUSION

In the late 1990s, the drug company Warner-Lambert
hatched a plan to increase sales of Neurontin, an antiepileptic.277
Unlike GlaxoSmithKline's marketing of Wellbutrin, WarnerLambert's efforts were an obvious investment in deception. The
company promoted the drug-which its sales team dubbed
"snake oil"-for bipolar disorder and neuropathic pain caused by
disorders like Parkinson's disease.28 Because the data on Neurontin's effectiveness were ambiguous, Warner-Lambert engaged in an elaborate (and successful) scheme to publish posi279
tive results and suppress negative ones.
The Neurontin case highlights the key interest at stake in
the regulation of off-label marketing: patient welfare. Any rule
for evaluating off-label promotional speech must protect patients
from nefarious or careless pharmaceutical-company behavior.
For all its flexibility, the false advertising approach would not
compromise on safety. Take Warner-Lambert's actions as an example: the company misrepresented the experimental support in
a way that caused diligent psychiatrists and geriatricians to
0
prescribe an ineffective drug for seriously ill patients.28 It
wouldn't be a close case.
The false advertising framework advanced in this Comment
makes a difference only in close cases-instances in which physicians are attempting to distinguish among equally promising
treatment options. The US statutory scheme, common-law tradition, and Supreme Court jurisprudence all support the idea that
more-accurate information helps physicians make better decisions. The fact-driven false advertising analysis promotes the
dissemination of such useful information in a manner that also
encourages drug companies to shoulder an efficient share of the
burden in ensuring patient safety. Courts seeking a definition of
"false or misleading" in light of Caronia and POM Wonderful
would do well to adopt this approach.

277 See In re Neurontin Marketing and Sales PracticesLitigation, 2011 WL 3852254,
*2-6 (D Mass).
278 In re Neurontin Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation, 712 F3d 21, 26 (1st Cir
2013).
279 See id at 27-28.
280

See id at 30.

